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Abstract 
Purpose - The purpose of this study is to examine risk management committee (RMC) 
human capital based on Australian listed firms over 2007-2013, and further determine 
whether RMC human capital is associated with firm performance and  bankruptcy likelihood.  
Design/methodology/approach - Based on human capital theory, this study investigates the 
impact of RMC human capital, such as financial experience, tenure, on firm performance and 
on firms’ bankruptcy likelihood. Data was collected from companies’ annual report. 
Regression analysis was used to test the hypotheses.  
Findings –The results suggest the importance of risk management human capital, in terms of 
increasing firm performance and lowing the likelihood of bankruptcy. Specifically, the results 
indicate financial experience and tenure are the main factors increasing firm performance. 
For firms with female on the RMC, their bankruptcy likelihood is lower than firms without a 
female on RMC. However, the mere existence of a RMC, or managerial experience, auditing 
experience, accounting experience, qualifications and compensation do not individually 
impact on firm performance or bankruptcy likelihood.  
Implications - This paper provides empirical evidence on human capital theory from a risk 
management perspective. In addition, the study contributes to the literature by investigating 
whether RMC human capital determines firm performance and bankruptcy likelihood. The 
results of this study can inform firms in terms of the costs and benefits of investing in RMC 
human capital. Additionally, this study informs regulators about the current RMC human 
capital in Australia and provides implications to policy maker in relation to regulating better 
risk management practice – in relation to firms’ human capital.  
Originality/value 
This is the first study to provide insights into the role of RMC human capital, especially in 
terms of RMC human capital.  
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2720069 
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1. Introduction  
In light of accounting corporate collapses and the global financial crisis, risk management has 
been recognised as an important component to the corporate governance of firms (ASX 
CGPR, 2014). Risk management can be defined as coordinated activities to direct and control 
risk involved in organizations (ISO, 2009), with an objective of maximizing the wealth of 
company owners and to ensure companies are not jeopardised by excessive risk taking 
behaviours (Kaen, 2005).  Previous studies have identified that inadequate or inefficient risk 
management largely contribute to and worsen the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2008 
(Rosen, 2003; Kirkpatrick, 2009; ASX CGPR, 2014). Companies that fail to recognise and 
manage risks can adversely impact on the entity as well as various parties, such as 
employees, customers, suppliers, creditors, consumers, taxpayers and the boarder community 
in which the entity operates. Whereas for companies with good risk management, they can 
protect investors’ value and assist in identifying opportunities to create value1 for companies 
(ASX CGPR, 2014). Therefore, forming an efficient risk management plays a crucial part of 
corporate governance (ASX Corporation Governance Principles and Recommendations, 
2014).  
The Australian setting is of interest to examine risk management practice as many countries, 
including US, typically do not require such risk management disclosures. In addition, ASX 
CGC introduced corporate governance principles and recommendations (CGPR) in 2003, 
which was subsequently amended in 2007, 2010 and 2014. One of the principles - Principle 7 
of the ASX CGPR provides the primary guidance applicable to companies for risk 
management in Australia. This guideline recommends Australian companies have committee 
or committees to manage their risks efficiently (ASX CGPR, 2014), as delegating a 
committee to addressing different elements of risk can provide an efficient and effective 
                                                             
1
Previous research suggest that successfully managing risk can lower the firm’s expected tax payment, 
encourage and protect firm specific investments, assist firms in developing financial plans and funding programs, 
and reduce financial distress and bankruptcy costs (Froot et al., 1993; Kaen, 2005). 
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mechanism to bring the transparency, focus and independent judgement to oversee the 
entity’s risk management framework (ASX CGPR, 2014), which consequently enhances the 
level of risk management. Specifically, ASX CGPR (2014) suggest that RMC should have 
members with necessary technical knowledge and experience in order to have the capacity to 
meet their risk management responsibilities. As risk management committee members bear 
the fundamental responsibility of risk management, their members’ human capital, such as 
qualifications and experience, play a crucial role. Risk management human capital determine 
the boards’ ability to monitor companies’ risk management practice, control managers’ risk 
taking behaviour and ensure appropriate risk governance functioning of risk management 
committee (Bilimoria and Piderit, 1994; Carter et al., 2010).In addition, a number of studies 
have point out the importance of risk management human capital in efficiently managing 
risks. For example, Rosen (2003), Kirkpatrick (2009) and Pirson and Turnbull (2011) suggest 
that companies have insufficient knowledge to monitoring, understand and analysis risk 
information, leading to firm bankruptcy during the GFC period.  
Objective of the study 
Human capital theory suggests individuals and society can produce economic benefits by 
investing in people and high levels of human capital can increase people’s productivity 
(Becker, 1993; Mincer, 1974; Sweetland, 1996). Therefore, based on human capital theory, 
firms with high human capital in risk management may increase risk management efficiency 
and generate positive outcomes for firms. Therefore, the aim of the study is to investigate the 
effect of firms’ investment in human capital, in terms of risk management, specifically, we 
examine the impact of the RMC human capital on firm performance and the likelihood of 
bankruptcy. Therefore, two research questions are developed to address these issues:  
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RQ1: What is the relationship between firms’ human capital in risk management and 
corporate performance?  
RQ2: What is the relationship between firms’ human capital in risk management and 
bankruptcy likelihood?  
In order to address these two research questions, regression analysis was used.  The results 
suggest the mere existence of a RMC have no impact on firm performance and bankruptcy 
likelihood, whereas RMC human capital plays an important role in increasing firm 
performance and lowering bankruptcy likelihood. Specifically, the results indicate financial 
experience and tenure are the main factors that increase firm performance. For firms with a 
female on RMC, the risk of bankruptcy is lower. However, managerial experience, auditing 
experience, accounting experience, qualifications and compensation individually have no 
impact on firm performance or bankruptcy likelihood.  
 
Contribution 
This study contributes to the literature by providing empirical evidence on the human capital 
theory from a risk management perspective, and draws on research that attempts to determine 
whether human capital is associated with firm performance (e.g. Chen and Hamrick, 2012; 
Crook et al., 2011) and research that determines the association between risk management 
and firm performance (e.g. Orlitzky and Benjamin, 2001; Pagach and Warr, 2010; Gordon et 
al., 2009). The practical contribution of this study is to inform firms in terms of the costs and 
benefits of investing in RMC human capital. Additionally, this study informs regulators about 
the current RMC human capital in Australia and provides implications to policy makers in 
relation to regulating better risk management practice – in relation to firms’ human capital.  
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, a brief overview of risk 
management theory and related literature is provided, followed by hypothesis development. 
Then, followed by research design and results section. The final section of the paper provides 
conclusion of the study.  
 
2. Related literature, theory and hypothesis development  
2.1 Risk management theory  
Risk management literature consistently suggests that risk management can add value to 
companies in many different facets and can decrease firms’ financial distress likelihood 
(Smithson and Simkins, 2005). For instance, on the basis of the shareholder value 
maximization hypothesis, modern financial theory indicates that a firm will engage in risk 
management if, and only if, they enhance the firm’s value (Fatemi and Luft, 2002).  In 
addition, Smith and Stulz (1985) provide the initial financial distress arguments of risk 
management, arguing that risk management can reduce the likelihood of financial distress 
and increase firm value, by reducing in allocative inefficiency (i.e. deadweight costs), and 
increasing debt capacity, which in turn can benefit the firm through valuable tax shields or by 
decreasing agency costs in excess free cash flow. This is supported by Graham and Rogers 
(2002), who suggest risk management can increase firms’ market value by allowing firms to 
increase their debt capacity, through reducing income volatility and/or reducing the 
probability of financial distress (Stulz, 1996; Leland, 1998), thereby reducing the adverse 
effects of financial distress on shareholders’ value. As a result, shareholders will demand a 
lower rate of return and increase firm value through decreasing financial distress likelihood 
(Fatemi and Luft, 2002).  
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From an agency theory perspective, risk management strategies such as hedging can reduce 
agency costs and increase shareholders’ wealth. Unlike shareholders, managers cannot 
diversify away the unique risks associated with the company, which is known as 
unsystematic risks. However, unsystematic risks can be eliminated by managers through 
using different risk management strategies, such as hedging. Thus, managers would be more 
likely to undertake projects that are profitable based on their systematic risk exposures not on 
unsystematic risks, which is in line with the interests of shareholders (Kaen, 2005). 
Therefore, risk management can decrease the agency conflicts and align the interest between 
managers and shareholders, leading to increase in firm performance.  
Additionally, risk management may solve underinvestment problems, as risk management 
can ensure firms have adequate internally generated funds necessary to undertake positive 
NPV projects. Accordingly, both firm and shareholder value will be increased (Fatemi and 
Luft, 2002). In particular, Froot et al. (1993) demonstrated that risk management can add 
values to firms by ensuring sufficient internal funds are available to take advantage of NPV 
(net present value) projects. Consistent with Froot et al. (1993), Gay and Nam (1998) 
provided strong evidence that the value enhancement of risk management comes from 
minimizing the probability of the underinvestment problems. Their results demonstrated that 
firms with enhanced investment opportunity sets, actively engaged in risk management as 
their internal generated cash level declines (Gay and Nam, 1998).  
In conclusion, previous theories and empirical evidence illustrate that risk management has 
positive impacts on firms’ performance through various avenues and can lower the financial 
distress. Since the risk management committee (RMC) is a crucial component in overseeing 
firms’ risk management, the human capital or the capacity of RMC may also have an 
influence on firms’ performance and financial distress likelihood.  
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Given the focus of this study is on risk management human capital, human capital theory has 
particular applicability to the study. Human capital theory suggests individuals and society 
can produce economic benefits by investing in people, such as investment in education 
(Mincer, 1974; Sweetland, 1996). It also indicates human capital as a stock of knowledge and 
skills can increase people’s productivity (Becker, 1993). Therefore, firms with high level of 
human capital in risk management have a positive impact on risk management efficiency and 
may generate benefits for firms, such as increase firm performance and lower bankruptcy 
likelihood. 
 
2.2. RM human capital and firm performance 
Agency theory suggests that there are conflicts of interest between managers and 
shareholders that managers may seek to increase their own returns at the expense of 
shareholders. Due to information asymmetry problem, managers have an ability to act at their 
best interest instead of shareholders (Carter et al., 2010). Evidence of this self-interested 
managerial behaviour includes avoidance of risk optimal decision. To be specific, unlike 
managers, who has a substantial proportion of earnings tied up in the one firm, shareholders 
are assumed to hold a diversified portfolio of investments (Kaen, 2005). As a result, 
managers tend to be more risk averse than shareholders. In other words, managers are more 
likely to reject profitable (but more risky) investments in which shareholders would prefer 
managers to invest in. Asset pricing models suggest that investors are only rewarded by 
taking risk that arise from exposure to general market movements (i.e. systematic risk) rather 
than taking unsystematic risk. In this sense, investors are only compensated based on the beta 
– the riskiness of their investment profile (Tao and Hutchinson, 2013).  Therefore, 
shareholders can only maximise their wealth through risk taking, which means that the action 
of risk averse managers rejecting the profitable investments  are contrary to investors’ 
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interest, thus, they would be more likely to discount the price they are willing to pay for the 
firm’s shares, consequently leading to low firm value (Kaen, 2005).  
RMC serves as a monitoring mechanism ensures that risks in relate to diversification or non-
focused strategy are managed effectively (Kallamu and Saat, 2014). The board through its 
RMC platform can monitor the risk taking activities of managers, review the overall risk 
exposure of the firm (Ng et al., 2013; Tao and Hutchinson, 2013).  Therefore, RMC plays a 
crucial role in monitoring managers’ risk taking behaviours (Subramaniam et al., 2009) and 
in minimising the agency conflicts between shareholders and managers (Carter et al., 2010). 
Most importantly, RMC human capital, such as previous qualifications and experience, may 
influence the way members managing risks and making risky investment decisions, thus their 
human capital level may determine the efficiency of risk monitoring. This notion is in line 
with resource dependence theory, which suggests that firms require parties who have greater 
capacity to manage company’s risk activities, so that they can bring crucial risk management 
resources to firms and ensure firms’ strength in monitoring risks (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; 
Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Hillman et al., 2009). Therefore, RMC members with high level 
of human capital can bring enhanced knowledge to firms for managing risk efficiently and 
strengthen risk monitoring mechanism, with an outcome of enhance firm value.   
Although the literature of RMC human capital is sparse, a number of studies have highlight 
the importance of human capital in audit committee. For example, Defond et al. (2004) find 
that market react positively when accounting financial experts are assigned to audit 
committee and no reaction when assign non-accounting financial experts, which suggests that 
expertise can increase firm value. Chan and Li (2008) show that audit committee with the 
majority of members who are top executives of other publicly traded firms (i.e. expert-
independent director, have relevant expertise) results in positive firm value. Besides, a board 
comprising of more than 50% of expert-independent directors has a significantly positive 
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relationship with firm value. Since both audit committee and RMC are monitoring 
mechanisms within firms, thus the characteristics of audit committee can be applied to RMC 
(Ng et al., 2012). As such, we could expect that a RMC with high level of human capital can 
increase firm performance. Therefore, we developed the following hypothesis:  
H1: there is a positive association between RMC human capital and firm performance 
 
2.3 RMC human capital and bankruptcy likelihood 
There is a body of research highlighted the importance of corporate governance and the 
likelihood of financial distress or bankruptcy (Donker et al., 2009; Fich and Slezak, 2008).  
Previous research mainly examines board composition, board ownership and leadership 
factors such as board size, and independence, board share ownership and CEO duality as 
mitigating or exacerbating the probability of financial distress. For example, Fich and Slezak 
(2008) found that small firms with independent boards and large executive director 
shareholdings are less likely to be financially distressed. There is however, a lack of 
empirically research that examines whether risk management human capital has any 
association with the probability of firm’s financial distress. 
RMC has been regarded as an important platform to specifically address risk management 
issues within firms. As a result, the level of RMC human capital may also influence firms’ 
bankruptcy likelihood (Ng et al., 2013). Specifically, Ng et al. (2013) found RMC size and 
independence are negatively associated with underwriting risk
2
, suggesting larger RMC size 
leads to more objective and rational decision making, which can lower excessive risk taking. 
The results also suggested that an independent RMC provides more effective supervision 
                                                             
2
 measured as the proportion of loss incurred to premise earned 
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over risk issues and therefore reduces excessive risk taking
3
. This highlights the importance 
that certain human capital characteristics of RMC can have an effect on bankruptcy risk (i.e. 
excessive risk taking level). The results are consistent with resource dependence theory, 
which suggests that firms require external parties who have greater capacity to manage 
company’s activities, to bring crucial resources and strength to a firm (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Hillman et al., 2009). Thus, RMC members with high level 
of human capital can bring enhanced knowledge to firms for managing risk and maintaining 
their risk appetite.  
Since the human capital of RMC may influence their level of risk aversion and their way of 
managing risks and interpreting risks, we could argue that RMC with high level of human 
capital tends to have a deeper understanding of risks, and have the capacity to analysis risk 
taking level and ensure firms do not engage in excessive risk taking behaviours. In turn, the 
firms are less likely to face financial distress and thus decrease the probability of bankruptcy. 
Similarly, signalling theory also suggests that it is beneficial for firms to disclose high level 
of RMC human capital, as this can signal to the market that managers are aware of the risk 
their firm is exposed to and they are capable of managing risks instead of engaging in 
excessive risk taking behaviours, thus indicating they are less likely to suffer from financial 
distress (Cotter et al., 2011). 
Empirically, a number of studies suggest that when firms face with high level of bankruptcy, 
members are less likely to invest in human capital (Butt-Jaggia and Thakor, 1994; Berk et al., 
2008). Specifically, Butt-Jaggia and Thakor (1994) indicate that debt usage, as a factor that 
affects the probability of bankruptcy, can be influenced by firms’ human capital. In addition, 
Dimov and Shepherd (2005) indicate top management teams with high proportion of MBA 
                                                             
3 If the dispersion of underwriting risk around the expected value is positive, that means firms are engaged in 
excessive risk taking, negative otherwise.  
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and law degree are negatively associated with the proportion of portfolio companies that went 
bankrupt, and their science and humanities education are positive associated with the 
proportion of profile companies that went public (IPO).  
Therefore, based on human capital theory, resource dependency theory and previous 
empirical evidence, a positive directional hypothesis is proposed: 
H1: there is a positive association between RMC human capital and the likelihood of 
bankruptcy  
 
3. Research design  
3.1 Sample 
The sample comprised of the top 100 ASX listed companies, measured by market 
capitalisation of each year, that have a RMC during the 7-year period, 2007 to 2013. After 
deleting the firms that do not have a RMC, our sample size decreases from 700 to 462 firm 
observations of 117 firms. Therefore, it provides an unbalanced panel dataset of 117 firms. 
For these companies, their RMC human capital were identified from their annual report and 
coded for the subsequent analysis. The sample profile by industry sector code is presented in 
Table 1. 
3.2 Research model and measures  
In order to answer RQ1 and RQ2, regression models were utilised to test the impact of RMC 
human capital on firm performance, and on bankruptcy likelihood. The financial data was 
collected from Thomson Returns and the Morningstar database, while non-financial data was 
hand-collected from the companies’ annual reports and the ASX website.  
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As hypothesised, the following regression model is utilized to test the association between the 
RMC human capital, firm performance and bankruptcy likelihood.  
 
Yi,t= a +b1RMCi,t+ b2Tenurei,t+ b3RMi,t + b4Genderi,t + b5Finexpi,t + b6Manexpi,t + b7Accexpi,t 
+ b8Audexpi,t+b8Educationi,t +b9Compeni,t +b9Controlsi,t +ɛi,t 
 
Table 2 presents a more detailed description of all variable definitions. 
 
Dependent variables 
Financial performance: Return on assets (ROA) which is net income plus interest expense 
multiplied by (1-corporate tax rate)] divided by [total assets - outside equity interests] is a 
common measure of firm performance (e.g. Huson et al., 2004). 
Bankruptcy Risk: To determine whether a separate RMC reduces the likelihood of financial 
distress a proxy is needed to measure the probability of bankruptcy.  Early indicators of 
bankruptcy include losses in multiple consecutive years, cash flows drying up, declining 
sales, etc. The most popular and robust measure of bankruptcy risk is the Altman Z score 
model that uses discriminant analysis (DA) to combine five accounting ratios into a score that 
represents the bankruptcy risk inherent in a firm (Altman 1968). Although the model was 
introduced in the late 1960s, it is still relevant and used for financial research to proxy for 
financial distress and default risk (Aslan and Kumar, 2012; Becker and Stromberg, 2012).  
Altman (1968: 606) derived a "cut-off" point, or optimum Z value, by observing firms which 
were misclassified by the DA model in the initial sample. He concluded that all firms with a 
Z score of greater than 2.99 clearly fall into the "non-bankrupt" sector, while those firms with 
a Z below 1.81 are bankrupt. Consequently, firms are classified as firms with a small z score 
(≤ 1.81) recognised as a high probability of bankruptcy and with a high z score (≥ 2.99) 
recognised as a low probability of bankruptcy.  
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The Altman Z-score is based on five financial ratios calculated from publically available 
obtain a firm’s annual report. The Altman Z-score is calculated as follows:  
Z-Score = 1.2A + 1.4B + 3.3C + 0.6D + 1.0E 
where:  
A = Working Capital/Total Assets: WC = (Current assets - cash) - (current liabilities – short 
term debt)  
B = Retained Earnings/Total Assets 
C = Earnings Before Interest & Tax/Total Assets 
D = Market Value of Equity/Total Liabilities 
E = Sales/Total Assets  
Altman (1968: 608) suggests that the predictive model is useful for screening out undesirable 
investments as investors tend to underestimate the extent of financial difficulties of the firms 
that eventually go bankrupt. 
 
Independent variables  
 
The independent variable in this study is RMC human capital. Specifically, according to 
previous literature, this study has identified five types of human capital that have been 
frequently examined in previous research, namely tenure, experiences, education, gender and 
compensation. 
1) Tenure  
Tenure is the number of year that a director has held in a particular position (Laing and Weir, 
1999). It represents the extent of company-specific skills or experience that board obtain to 
perform the task (Hogan and McPheters, 1980; Bilimoria and Piderit, 1994; Wulf and Singh, 
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2011). According to expertise hypothesis, long tenure of a director is associated with high 
level of experience, commitment and competence about the firm and the business 
environment that the firm operates in (Vafeas, 2003). With directors spend more and more 
time serving on board, directors are face a variety of issues that may enhance their familiarly 
with specific governance issues and problems of the company (Kesner, 1988). Since directors 
with considerable length of tenure can have a better knowledge of the management team and 
directing companies’ strategy, thus they are better prepared for oversight responsibilities 
(Bilimoria and Piderit, 1994). Following this trend, a considerable length of tenure of RMC 
members can be beneficial in effectively oversight RM activities and carrying out RM 
strategies.  
2) Education  
Education refers to the number of qualifications of risk management committee members – 
bachelor, master or PHD degree (Aldamen et al., 2012). Professionals gain knowledge 
through formal education (Hitt et al., 2001). The value of professionals’ education often holds 
throughout their careers (D’Aveni, 1996).  Individuals graduating from universities often 
develop and maintain social networks that can be valuable to increasing knowledge and 
experience (D’Aveni and Kesner, 1993).  
3) Experiences  
It is generally agreed experience with performing a certain task leads to improved expertise in 
that task (Tian et al., 2011).  Therefore, for individuals with a high level of task expertise can 
make better decisions in that task as well as judge the qualification of others in performing 
the similar tasks (Bandura, 1997). This is because individuals with experience in an area have 
already developed knowledge and expertise in that certain area (Day and Lord, 1992). 
Following this notion, risk management committee members with experience with 
performing in risk management activity have developed relevant risk management knowledge 
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and expertise. Therefore, it may argued that risk management committee members with 
previous risk management experience can be better at risk management compared than 
members do not have relevant risk management experience.  
Financial experience is largely investigated in the previous literature as it can significantly 
add value to a firm and is highly related to the monitoring role of boards (Dionne et al., 
2013). Committee members’ specific knowledge from the complex financial sector enables 
them to monitor and advise on their area of responsibility (Tao and Hutchinson, 2013). 
Committee members with additional financial expertise can change the structure and focus of 
the committee’s discussion which may be more beneficial to firms (McDaniel et al., 2002). 
As risk management activities are involved within a firm’s financial activities, such as 
sophisticated financial tools, risk management committee members with financial experience 
are highly desirable to oversee risk management matters and monitor risk management 
system (Kaen, 2005; Dionne et al., 2013). Similarly, risk management committee members 
who have management, accounting or auditing experience may have a particular advantage in 
managing risks due to previous experiences.  
4) Compensation 
Compensation is a reasonable measurement for the productivity of risk management 
committee members. The productivity of risk management committee members can be 
derived from the effort they put into managing risk, and the risk management skills that they 
obtained, or a combination (Wulf and Singh, 2011). Previous research suggests the 
compensation of risk management committee members measured by labour market has 
served as an indication of the value of the human capital that they bring to the company 
(Harris and Helfat, 1997; Wulf and Singh, 2011). Therefore, risk management committee 
members with high salary payment may indicate their high level of risk management 
productivity. 
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5) Gender diversity 
Gender diversity is another factor that may affects risk management. Previous researches 
suggest gender diversity may enhance corporate governance and board monitoring. 
Specifically, Gul et al. (2013) suggest gender diversity of boards may lead to high level of 
board discussion and monitoring on companies’ issues, induce managers to disclose more 
information on the operations, transactions, and strategy. Higgs (2003) and Tyson (2003) 
argue that gender diversity may improve board effectiveness, organizational value and 
performance by offering new sights and perspectives. It can also enhance the knowledge 
base, creativity and innovation of a committee (Carter et al., 2003; Erhardt et al., 2003). 
Many governance reform proposals indicate that gender diversity is an important factor that 
increases corporate governance and firms’ financial performance. For example, ASX CGPR 
(2014) recommends Australia companies should have a gender diversity board, which also 
highlight the importance of gender diversity. Therefore, since gender diversity can offering 
new sights, enhance board monitoring and knowledge base, high level of gender diversity of 
RMC members may enhance the RM practice.  
Control variables 
We control for firm factors that are likely to be related to RMC human capital, firm 
performance and bankruptcy likelihood, such as industry, leverage, and past performance. 
Including lagged performance (ROAt-1) as an independent variable allows for performance 
persistence and for feedback from past performance to current RMC existence (Bohren and 
Strom, 2010; Wooldridge, 2002). Inclusion of the lag of the dependent variable is likely to 
mitigate concerns over reverse causality and omitted variables. To the extent that omitted 
correlated variables are relatively stable, their effects can be captured by lagged values of the 
dependent variable. 
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This study controls for growth opportunities (MTB), measured as the market to book ratio. 
Growth opportunities capture changes in economic conditions that could be exploited by a 
distressed firm. If there is a change in the market demand for a product that improves firm’s 
growth options, then that firm will be less likely to become bankrupt (Fich and Slezak, 2008). 
Higher growth opportunities provide incentives to invest sub optimally, or to accept risky 
projects that expropriate wealth from debtholders. This raises the cost of borrowing and thus 
growth firms tend to use internal resources or equity capital rather than debt. Consequently, 
growth influences the likelihood of financial bankruptcy (Deesomsak et al., 2004).  
 
Leverage (LEV) is included as it likely to be associated with firm performance as higher 
leverage is associated with greater risk of financial failure. Year (Year) dummies are also 
included to demonstrate the effects of regulation. This study also controls firm size (lnTA) as 
large companies are less likely to be in financial stress (Huang and Zhao, 2008), while firm 
size is likely to lead to greater performance and negatively associated with firm risk (Pathan, 
2009). Industry (INDUS) is controlled as different industries have quite different debt ratios 
(Huang and Zhao, 2008).This study also controls for board independence (INDEP), board 
size (BRDSIZE), CEO duality (CEO), RMC members’ ownership (SHARE)as it often cited 
as important governance monitoring variables (for example: Huang and Zhao, 2008; Fich and 
Slezak, 2008; Bredart, 2014). 
 
4. Results and discussion  
 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 3 provides the descriptive statistics of the variables in the regression model. Results 
suggest that sample companies have a low level of leverage, with a mean of 0.54. The mean 
score for firms daily stock return is 8.89 (maximum 31.6) suggesting a great variability of 
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returns for the sample firms. On average, firms have 2.48 of growth opportunities. 
Additionally, the board size has a mean of 9.17, ranging from 3 to 16 members and on 
average 69 percent of the board directors are independent from management.  
In relation to RMC human capital, RMC members have an average tenure of 5.48 years, 
ranging from 0.5 to 15.33 and an average of 3.5 years of risk management experience. 
Among the financial, managerial, accounting and auditing experience, the figures show that 
on average, 74% of RMC members have management experience, 46% of RMC have 
financial experience, whereas only 19% and 4% have accounting and auditing experience. 
Table 3 presents that the average number of qualifications that hold by the members are quite 
low, with a mean of 1.51 and a maximum of 3.33. In addition, more than 57% of the firms 
have female RMC members.  
 
4.2 Hypotheses Testing- Multivariate tests 
Random-effects GLS regression 
Multivariate tests are used to determine the association between RMC human capital and firm 
performance as well as the relationship between RMC human capital and the probability of 
bankruptcy by testing the first and second hypotheses. The results of testing the hypotheses 
using random-effects generalized least square (GLS) regression with clustered standard errors 
on company and unbalanced panel data are reported in Table 4. The explanatory power of the 
two regression models is quite high, with the R
2
valued at 40.77% and 48.28% respectively. 
The details of the results are discussed below.  
 
Human capital variables  
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Tenure - Consistent with our expectation, RMC members’ tenure is significant and positive 
related to firm performance, suggesting tenure is one of the factor that increases firm 
performance. However, the results show an insignificant relationship between tenure and 
bankruptcy likelihood, which is consistent with previous studies (e.g. Wulf and Singh, 2011). 
Financial experience - for firms with high proportion of RMC members with financial 
experience, their firm performance is higher. However, we did not find evidence any 
significant relationship between financial experience and bankruptcy likelihood.  
Gender - the results indicate that having female RMC members have no impact on firm 
performance. However, the results indicate that there is a positive relationship between 
ZSCORE and female on board, indicating RMC with female member can significant lower 
the likelihood offirm going to bankruptcy. This is consistent with previous argument that 
women are more risk adverse and are less likely to engage in excessive risk taking behaviours 
(Carter et al., 2003; Erhardt et al., 2003). For other RMC human capital variables, we did not 
find they have any impact on firm performance or bankruptcy likelihood.  
Control variables 
CEO duality - According to table 4, CEO duality lowers firm performance, which aligns with 
agency theory, which suggest the separation between the title of CEO and board chair will 
improve firm performance as board of directors can better minor the CEO behaviour (Cotter 
et al., 2011). Although CEO duality leads to a lower firm performance, the results show that 
it also lowers firms’ bankruptcy likelihood. This may explained by the reason that people 
who are both CEO and the chairman may have incentive to protect their reputation. This is 
because reputation can help them gain advantage at the time they need to transfer their 
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general skills to other firms (Fich and Shivdasani, 2007). Therefore, in order to build and 
protect their reputation, they may behave conservatively and avoid taking hence lower return 
(Hirshleifer and Thakor, 1992).  
Shareholding - The results reveal that the percentage of shares that hold by RMC members 
affects firm performance and bankruptcy likelihood. Specifically, we found for RMC with 
high level of share ownership, their firm performance increases and it decreases the chances 
of firms going to bankruptcy. This supports that notion that large stockholders are more likely 
to pay attention to the strategic and risk management decisions of firms (Edwards and Nibler, 
2000), and make sure companies are managing their risk properly, not exposing  or taking 
excessive risks, thus, safeguard investors’ investments.  
Leverage – the results suggest that high level of leverage decreases firm performance and it 
also increases the chances of firm going to bankrupt. 
Risk – As we expected, high risk leading to increase in bankruptcy risk.  
Size and past performance– large firms and firms with high past performance tend to have 
high level of firm performance. However, the results show that big firms and firms that have 
high prior performance are more likelihood to go to bankrupt.  
 
5. Robustness test  
Heckman test- Self-selection may be a concern with the results because Australian firms can 
choose whether to establish a RMC (ASX CGPR, 2013). A firm’s choice of having a RMC 
may introduce bias into the results, as firms with high performance may more likely to 
choose to establish a RMC than firms with low performance.  In addition, some of the factors 
that are correlated with a firm’s choice of adopting RMC may also be correlated with the 
observed firm performance and bankruptcy likelihood. Therefore, these non-observable 
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factors my potentially give biased results.  In order to verify the results, we use all top 100 
ASX listed firms as our sample, the test period remains 2007 to 2013, thus we have included 
firms with and without a RMC, and test whether firms with high performance and low 
bankruptcy likelihood are more likely to establish a RMC.  The two-stage Heckman (1976) 
procedures are used to control for problems of selection bias and omitted variables. In the 
first stage, we run a probit regression. The dependent variable is ARMC, and similar with 
previous study, the test includes board size, CEO duality, board independence (Subramanian 
et al., 2009). Year and industry are also included in the test.  Using the parameters from this 
model, the Inverse Mills Ratio was computed for all sample firms (Heckman 1978; Johnston 
and DiNardo 1997). In the second stage, we run OLS model and include this Mills ratio 
obtained from the first stage in the regression analysing as a control variable, to control for 
the endogeneity of the choice of RMC. The regression model is shown below
4
:  
Yi,t= a +b1ARMCi,t+ b2CEOi,t+ b3STDDEVi,t + b4LEVi,t + b5ROA-1i,t + b6BRDSIZEi,t + 
b7lnTAi,t + b8INDUSi,t+b8YEARi,t +b9MTBi,t +b9INDEPsi,t + Mills +ɛi,t 
 
The results are presented in Table 5. The results suggest that RMC is insignificant related to 
firm performance and bankruptcy likelihood, suggesting that the choice of RMC does not 
bias the result.  
 
VIF test- In addition, this study also checked for multicollinearity issues using variance 
inflation factor (VIF). The results suggests that all our VIF are quite low, ranging from 1.08 
to 4.15, suggesting multicollinearity should not be an issue for the regression models.   
 
 
                                                             
4
Y: firm performance, bankruptcy likelihood. ARMC: dummy, 1 if firms with a RMC, 0 otherwise  
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6. Conclusion  
With the increasing emphasis on risk management and risk management committee, the need 
to better understand risk management practice is clearly crucial. Specifically, human capital 
theory highlights the importance of RMC human capital. As a result, this study provides 
some evidence on the value of risk management human capital in relation to firm 
performance and firms’ bankruptcy likelihood. The findings of this study suggest that risk 
management human capital plays some roles in increase firm performance and lower 
bankruptcy likelihood. First, the results show that the tenure, financial experience and 
percentage of shareholding by RMC members have a positive relationship with firm 
performance. Secondly, the results indicate that female on RMC can significantly lower firms 
bankruptcy likelihood. For firms with high level of shares hold by RMC members, their 
probability of going to bankrupt is low. Finally, this study did not find compensation, 
qualifications and managerial, accounting auditing experience play any role in increase firm 
performance and lower bankruptcy likelihood.  
There are however some limitations of the study. First, the data of RMC human capital were 
identified in companies’ annual reports. It is possible that companies may use other channel, 
such as company website, to disclose their human capital information. Therefore, future 
studies may conduct some surveys of RMC members, or gather RMC human capital from 
different sources. Second, the human capital variables used in this study may not represent 
the whole picture of a company’s risk management human capital, thus, future studies may 
examine other human capital variables.  
In conclusion, this study indicates the importance of risk management human capital. Given 
the increasing demand of risk management, further studies on risk management human 
capital is important.  
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Table 1: Sample profile (462 firm observations, 117 firms)  
Industry (GICS) sector No. of companies 
Financials 32 
Materials 18 
Consumer Discretionary 17 
Industrials 15 
Energy 12 
Consumer Staples 9 
Health Care 5 
Utilities 5 
Telecommunication Services 2 
Information Technology 2 
Total No. 117 
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Table2: Variable definitions 
Variables  
Dependent variables Explanations  
Firm performance(ROA) Firm profitability, measured by return to asset ratio, ROA 
Bankruptcy likelihood (ZSCORE) Altman Z score  
Predictors  
RMC Dummy variable, taking a rate of 1 when firms with a separate RMC, 
0 when firms with a combined RMC.  
Tenure  Average number of years as a member of a firm 
RM experience (RM) Average years of risk management experience of RMC members 
Gender Dummy variable, taking a rate of 1 when firms RMC contain female 
member, 0 otherwise. 
Financial experience (Finexp) The proportion of RMC members who have financial experience 
Management experience (Manexp) The proportion of RMC members who have managerial experience 
Accounting experience (Accexp) The proportion of RMC members who have accounting experience 
Auditing experience (Audexp) The proportion of RMC members who have auditing experience 
Education  The average number of qualifications obtained by RMC members 
Compensation (Compen) The average committee fee of RMC members 
Controls  
Leverage (LEV) The financial leverage of the firm, computed as total liabilities to 
total assets 
Growth opportunity (MTB) Market to book ratio. The ratio of year-end market capitalization to 
total common equity. 
Firm size (lnTA) The natural logarithm of total asset as at 30 June 
Risk (STDDEV) total risk calculated as the standard deviation of firm daily stock  
returns for each fiscal year 
CEO duality (CEO) dummy variable, taking a rate of 1 if the CEO is also the chair,  0 
otherwise 
Board size (BRDSIZE) number of board members 
RMC share ownership (SHARE) The average percentage of RMC members shareholding 
Prior year firm performance (ROA-
1) 
measured by return to asset ratio of the prior year 
Board independence (INDEP) the percentage of board member who are independent calculated as 
the independent board total/ total number of board 
Industry (INDUS) Coded based on the GICS (Global Industry Classification Standard) 
Year Year dummy variable 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics (N = 462 observations - 117 firms) 
Variable N MEAN STD.DEV MIN MAX 
STDDEV 461 8.89 4.97 0 31.6 
INDEP 460 0.69 0.18 0.2 1 
LEV 447 0.54 0.23 0 1.57 
MTB 446 2.48 2.83 -20.35 25.01 
BRDSIZE 462 9.17 2.22 3 16 
ZSCORE 412 3.79 7.21 -3.95 90.39 
ROA 445 0.07 0.07 -0.34 0.62 
ROA-1 445 0.05 0.46 -9.42 0.62 
lnTA 448 4.28 0.02 4.16 4.35 
SHARE 415 0.0044 0.04 0 0.67 
Compen 460 16474.57 11819.64 0 39375 
RM 462 3.50 1.75 0 10 
Tenure 461 5.48 1.75 0.5 15.33 
Finexp 462 0.46 0.28 0 1 
Manexp 462 0.74 0.27 0 1 
Accexp 462 0.19 0.18 0 0.67 
Audexp 462 0.04 0.10 0 0.33 
Education 461 1.51 0.69 0 3.33 
Gender 462 0.57 0.50 0 1 
Note: STDDEV: total risk calculated as the standard deviation of firm daily stock returns for each fiscal year; 
INDEP: the percentage of board member who are independent calculated as the independent board total/ total 
number of board; LEV: The financial leverage of the firm, computed as total liabilities to total assets; MTB: 
Market to book ratio. The ratio of year-end market capitalization to total common equity; BRDSIZE: number of 
board members; ZSCORE: probability of bankruptcy calculated using Altman Z score; ROA: current year return on 
assets; ROA-1 : prior year return on assets; lnTA: The natural logarithm of total asset; SHARE: The average 
percentage of RMC members shareholding; Compen: The average committee fee of RMC members; RM: Average 
years of risk management experience of RMC members; Finexp: The proportion of RMC members who have 
financial experience; Manexp: The proportion of RMC members who have managerial experience;Accexp: The 
proportion of RMC members who have accounting experience; Audexp: The proportion of RMC members who 
have auditing experience; Education: The average number of qualifications obtained by RMC members; Gender: 1 
when firms RMC contain female member, 0 otherwise. 
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Table 4: Random-effects GLS regressions with cluster robust errors. RMC and firm 
performance, bankruptcy likelihood 
 ROA 
Coef.(z) 
ZSCORE 
Coef.(z) 
ROAt-1 0.143 
(2.07) ** 
-0.034 
(-3.53)*** 
lnTA 5.04 
(6.14) *** 
-1.49 
(-3.54)*** 
STDDEV 0.0016 
(1.01) 
-0.0007 
(-2.22) ** 
RMC 0.007 
(0.54) 
-0.002 
(-0.91) 
YEAR -0.0015 
(-0.6) 
-0.002 
(-2.21)** 
INDEP 0.022 
(0.38) 
0.011 
(0.69) 
CEO -0.09 
(-2.06) ** 
0.02 
(1.66)* 
BRDSIZE 0.013 
(0.22) 
-0.025 
(-1.04) 
LEV -0.02 
(-0.55) * 
-0.08 
(-2.63)*** 
MTB -0.02 
(-7.46)*** 
0.001 
(1.03) 
Material  -0.09 0.02 
 (-2.48)** (2.12)** 
Energy 0.002 0.02 
 (0.04) (2.13)** 
Gender  -0.01 0.008 
 (-0.91) (1.87)* 
SHARE 0.17 0.31 
 (2.53)** (1.74)* 
Tenure  0.10 0.003 
 (2.33)** (0.19) 
RM -0.04 0.003 
 (-1.41) (0.29) 
Finexp 0.06 -0.006 
 (1.66)* (-0.57) 
Manexp 0.001 0.00 
 (0.06) (0.10) 
Accexp -0.044 -0.02 
 (-1.21) (-1.60) 
Audexp -0.001 0.0002 
 (-0.52) (0.01) 
Education -0.002 0.0014 
 (-0.2) (0.62) 
Compen -0.00 -0.00 
 (-0.44) (-0.05) 
CONS -20.52 
(-5.87)*** 
9.16 
(5.11) *** 
 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects          Yes Yes 
Observations 
Firms 
379 
94 
363 
89 
Wald chi2 3937.57 1190.76 
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Two tailed tests significant at p<0.01***; p<0.05**; p≤ 0.10* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes:  Note: STDDEV: total risk calculated as the standard deviation of firm daily stock returns for each fiscal year; 
INDEP: the percentage of board member who are independent calculated as the independent board total/ total number of 
board; LEV: The financial leverage of the firm, computed as total liabilities to total assets; MTB: Market to book ratio. The 
ratio of year-end market capitalization to total common equity; BRDSIZE: number of board members; ZSCORE: probability 
of bankruptcy calculated using Altman Z score; ROA: current year return on assets; ROA-1 : prior year return on assets; 
lnTA: The natural logarithm of total asset; SHARE: The average percentage of RMC members shareholding; Compen: The 
average committee fee of RMC members; RM: Average years of risk management experience of RMC members; Finexp: 
The proportion of RMC members who have financial experience; Manexp: The proportion of RMC members who have 
managerial experience;Accexp: The proportion of RMC members who have accounting experience; Audexp: The proportion 
of RMC members who have auditing experience; Education: The average number of qualifications obtained by RMC 
members; Gender: 1 when firms RMC contain female member, 0 otherwise; RMC: Dummy variable, taking a rate of 1 
when firms with a separate RMC, 0 when firms with a combined RMC; Year:  Year dummy variable 
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Table 5: Random-effects GLS regressions with cluster robust errors. RMC and firm 
performance, bankruptcy likelihood 
Two tailed tests significant at p<0.01***; p<0.05**; p≤ 0.10* 
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 ROA 
Coef.(z) 
ZSCORE 
Coef.(z) 
ROAt-1 -0.005 
(-1.63) 
0.0003 
(0.27) 
lnTA 1.22 
(4.45) *** 
-0.244 
(-2.25)** 
STDDEV -0.005 
(-1.13) 
0.004 
(1.30) 
ARMC 0.01 
(1.42) 
-0.001 
(-0.39) 
YEAR 0.005 
(1.41) 
-0.004 
(-1.57) 
INDEP 0.149 
(1.54) 
-0.07 
(-1.34) 
CEO 0.07 
(1.13) 
-0.034 
(-1.06) 
BRDSIZE -1.42 
(-1.34) 
1.005 
(1.53) 
LEV -0.06 
(-1.92)* 
-0.273 
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MTB -0.15 
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0.135 
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Mills 0.87 -0.6 
 (1.40) (-1.58) 
CONS -6.51 
(-1.99)** 
6.09 
(3.12) *** 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects          Yes Yes 
Observations 
Firms 
628 
150 
602 
143 
Wald chi2 377.78 680.00 
Notes:  Note: STDDEV: total risk calculated as the standard deviation of firm daily stock returns for each fiscal year; 
INDEP: the percentage of board member who are independent calculated as the independent board total/ total number of 
board; LEV: The financial leverage of the firm, computed as total liabilities to total assets; MTB: Market to book ratio. The 
ratio of year-end market capitalization to total common equity; BRDSIZE: number of board members; ZSCORE: probability 
of bankruptcy calculated using Altman Z score; ROA: current year return on assets; ROA-1 : prior year return on assets; 
lnTA: The natural logarithm of total asset; ARMC: Dummy variable, taking a rate of 1 when firms with a RMC, 0 otherwise; 
Year:  Year dummy variable 
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